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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

ARIZONA
In re Gila River Sys., 173 P.3d 440 (Ariz. 2007) (holding that a nonparty to a settlement agreement under the Arizona Water Settlements

Act could not object to a settlement where it could not show that the
settlement would materially injure its water rights and that the settlement agreement warranted approval where the preponderance of the
evidence established the settling tribe's water rights set forth in the
agreement were no more extensive than one could prove at trial).
Under the auspices of the Arizona Water Settlements Act
("AWSA"), which authorized the settlement of the federal water rights
claims, the Tohono O'odham Nation ("Nation"), the United States,
and other parties to the settlement (collectively "settling parties")
sought entry of the judgment confirming a settlement agreement.
Subsequently, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe ("Tribe"), a non-party to the settlement agreement, filed objections. After the Maricopa County Superior Court ("adjudication court") summarily disposed of the objections, the Arizona Supreme Court accepted interlocutory review of the
adjudication court's judgment and decree approving the settlement
agreement.
Previously, the Arizona Supreme Court had issued a "Special Procedural Order providing for the Approval of Federal Water Rights Settlements, Including Those of Indian Tribes" ("Special Order"), which,
in part, provided claimants with the opportunity to object if: (1) the
settlement "would cause material injury to the objector's claimed water
right;" (2) the parties did not meet the conditions for approval for
such a settlement; or (3) when "the water rights established in the settlement agreement ...

are more extensive than the Indian tribe ...

would have been able to establish at trial." Here, the Tribe claimed the
settlement agreement caused material injury to its water rights, specifically its groundwater and surface water rights under federal law, and
deprived the Tribe of its federal reserved water rights. The court held
that the Tribe's claims had no merit where the settlement only determined the water rights of the Nation, did not provide the Nation with
any federal reserved rights, and expressly reserved all rights and claims
of the Tribe. The court found that the settlement agreement and the
judgment and decree did not materially injure the Tribe's rights where
the Tribe retained all remedies available to it prior the approval of the
settlement.
The Special Order further mandated that a court approve a settlement if the settlement preserved the remedies of non-settling claimants, the parties reached the settlement in good faith, and the preponderance of the evidence established that the settling tribe's water
rights were no more extensive than the parties could prove at trial.
The Tribe claimed the settling parties failed to meet their burden of
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proof regarding the extent of the Nation's water rights where the adjudication court relied on an allegedly incomplete Arizona Department of Water Resources ("ADWR") assessment of the settlement and
did not hold an evidentiary hearing. The court disagreed, and held
that the adjudication court properly considered the Statement of
Claimant filed by the United States on behalf of the Nation and the
supporting ADWR assessment regarding the range of water rights the
Nation could claim. According to the court, the range of water rights
set forth in those documents was greater than the rights granted under
the settlement.
The court granted the Tribe's petition for interlocutory appeal, but
denied relief to the Tribe. Further, upon request of the settling parties, the court issued an expedited, final, and non-appealable decision
affirming the adjudication court's judgment and decree approving the
settlement agreement.
JulieAnderson
Davis v. Agua Sierra Res., L.L.C., 174 P.3d 298 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that severance and reservation of groundwater usage
rights from an associated real property grant is valid and not contrary
to Arizona water rights policy).
Merwyn Davis ("Davis") owned property located in the Big Chino
groundwater sub-basin in Yavapai County, Arizona, known as CF
Ranch. Davis acquired CF Ranch through a series of transactions and
grants, but each transaction reserved the commercial water rights associated with the property from conveyance. Agua Sierra Resources,
L.L.C. ("Agua Sierra") held the commercial water rights associated
with CF Ranch. In 2004, Davis filed a complaint in the district court
seeking ajudgment to invalidate Agua Sierra's commercial water rights
reservation associated with CF Ranch. Davis argued the reservation was
invalid because Arizona law does not permit severance of a water right
from land, does not permit creation of a future water right, and does
not recognize a water right for commercial purposes. The district
court held in favor of Davis, and found the reservation invalid. The
court focused largely on case law that held groundwater is not appropriable, but is instead subject to the doctrine of reasonable use, and
concluded that Arizona does not recognize the reservation of commercial groundwater rights. Agua Sierra appealed the judgment to the
Arizona Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by establishing that Arizona
water law differentiates groundwater from surface water users. Surface
water is subject to the doctrines of prior appropriation and beneficial
use, while groundwater is not appropriable allowing an overlying landowner to use it, subject to the doctrine of reasonable use. After establishing that the reservation at issue here comprehended rights to

